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The introduction of "eﬀort inducible" and "non-eﬀort inducible" work-
ers into an otherwise standard model of labor discipline produces a para-
dox of sorts: when ﬁrms cannot tell the diﬀerence, the predictable re-
ductions in both output and real wages are sometimes accompanied by
an increase in proﬁts. The resolution of this paradox is found in the dif-
ference in expected productivities of workers with and without jobs, the
source of a reputation eﬀect that alters the balance of labor market power.
When, as a consequence of the acquisition and depreciation of productive
skills, the relative proportions of such workers are then endogenized, the
model exhibits multiple equilibria for plausible parameter values. One
of these equilibria can be understood as a new sort of "underemployment
trap" with an atrophied primary sector.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: J41, E24
Keywords: labor discipline, reputation eﬀect, positive feedback, under-
employment trap
11I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
Can ﬁrms ever beneﬁt from incomple information about workers’ abilities or
job-related preferences? Consider an extension of the standard labor discipline
model (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) in which ﬁrms cannot distinguish between
two sorts of workers, those who could (and would, if the incentives warranted)
expend some predetermined level of eﬀective eﬀort ¯ e, and those who could not.2
Consistent with intuition, the expected mean productivities of those with and
without jobs will then diﬀer in a pooling equilibrium, where the diﬀerence can
be interpreted as the reputation cost of job loss. Ceteris paribus, these costs
increase the punishment value of dismissal and therefore alter the balance of
power in labor markets. In some cases, ﬁrms will then ﬁnd themselves better
oﬀ without such information.
This treatment of reputation shares some similarities with Greenwald’s (1987,
p. 325) model of adverse selection in labor markets, in which ﬁrms’ eﬀort to
reduce turnover rates for their better workers creates an environment in which
"workers who change jobs are marked by being part of an inferior group, which
lowers their future bargaining power and wages." Unlike Greenwald (1987),
however, this paper features the moral hazard/eﬀort extraction problem that
ﬁrms must (also) confront. The properties of the benchmark model in the
second section will perhaps also remind some of Levine’s (1988, 1989) work, in
which the introduction of "just cause" policies in labor discipline models in-
creases proﬁts because ﬁrms are forced to internalize the negative externalities
associated with overstrict dismissal policies.
To the extent that reputation costs constitute one of the "scars" (Ellwood
1982) of job loss, it becomes useful to compare the results of model calibration
exercises with the empirical literature on displacement costs. Farber (2003),
for example, calculates that for those who participated in one or more Displaced
Worker Surveys between 1981 and 2001, the diﬀerence between pre- and post-
displacement real wages for "full-time to full-time transitions" varied, from 0.9%
in 1997-1999 to 12.2% in 1989-1991. (As these particular numbers hint, the dif-
1The earliest versions of this paper beneﬁtted from conversations with Carolyn Craven,
John Geanakoplos, Ben Polak and David Weiman. It was revised while on leaves at Yale
and the University of Califorinia at San Diego, with additional feedback from Jeﬀ Carpenter.
The usual disclaimers hold.
2To be eﬀective, the eﬀort, however strenuous, must produce some threshold level of output.
2ference is also countercyclical, so it comes as no surprise that for the most recent
(1999-2001) of Farber’s (2003) cohorts, it increased to 10.6%.) Furthermore,
the data also reveal that in relative terms, less educated workers suﬀer more.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fs p e c i ﬁc human capital to such workers implies that the some-
times sudden depreciation of productive skills after displacement, and the need
to (re)acquire them when hired, will shape labor relations, a proposition that is
central to the extended model in the fourth section.
As Farber (2003) himself notes, however, these numbers understate the costs
of displacement: no transition is instantaneous, for example, and not all are
"full-time to full-time." On the basis of a longitudinal data set of Pennsylvanian
workers, Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1985) found that 24 months after
displacement, workers still earned 20 percent less than before, and that this
diﬀerence was persistent. These estimates more or less are consistent with
the more recent work of Schoeni and Dardia (1996), who studied workers in
California, and Stevens (1997), who examined the eﬀects of multiple job loss.
In a similar vein, Hall (1996) concluded on the basis of Ruhm’s (1991) PSID-
based estimates that the discounted value of lost earnings is equal to 120 percent
of average annual compensation.
The next section describes a discrete time model of labor discipline in which a
small fraction   of all workers do not expend eﬀective eﬀort, and draws attention
to one of its most important, if somewhat paradoxical, features: with the limited
information available to ﬁrms, total income falls but is redistributed so that
proﬁts, both absolute and as a share of national income, sometimes rise. The
third section evaluates the comparative statics of the model’s unique pooling
equilibrium3 for a set of reasonable parameter values, and ﬁnds that in practice,
the eﬀects on wages and employment could be substantial.
The existence of "non-eﬀort inducible" or NE workers needs to be ratio-
nalized, however, and this is the purpose of the fourth section, in which the
proportions of NE and eﬀort inducible or EI workers are endogenized. In par-
ticular, it is shown that when (a) the NE/EI distinction reﬂects diﬀerences in
productive skills and (b) there is some likelihood that the unemployed EI lose
these skills and become NE, and some likelihood that employed NE workers will
3Eﬀort inducible workers would of course prefer to signal this to ﬁr m s ,b u ti ti sn o tc l e a r
how this could be done. See, for example, Jullien and Picard (1998) and Albrecht and Vroman
(1999).
3(re)acquire them and become EI, labor markets will exhibit positive feedback
and (in some cases) multiple equilibria. One of the stable equilibria can be
understood as an unemployment trap or, if the model is recast as one with dual
labor markets as in Bulow and Summers (1986), an underemployment trap with
an atrophied primary sector. The section concludes with another comparative
statics exercise, this one on the eﬀe c t so fv a r i a t i o n si nt h er a t e sa tw h i c hh u m a n
capital is acquired and lost.
Like Azariadis and Drazen (1990) or Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990),
the extended model identiﬁes the labor market as the source of "threshold ex-
ternalities." As Topel (1999) observes in his review of the literature, however,
the required non-convexities can arise for many reasons, and this is perhaps the
ﬁrst paper in which labor discipline and reputation costs are featured.
The ﬁfth and ﬁnal section then summarizes the main results and describes
some possible extensions of the model.
2 Workers, Firms and Labor Market Equilib-
rium: A Benchmark Model
Suppose that there are (1 −  )H identiﬁcal and inﬁnite-lived eﬀort inducible
or EI workers, each with discount rate θ and within period VNM preferences
u(ω,e)=ω − e,w h e r eω is the real wage and e is eﬀort. At the start of each
(discrete) period, EI workers must decide whether to expend some minimum
eﬀort level ¯ e or to withhold their labor power, in which case e =0 .T h e r e
exists some likelihood d that ﬁrms will detect the absence of eﬀort each period,
and all detected workers are dismissed.4 Because the incentive condition for
E Iw o r k e r si ss a t i s ﬁed in equilibrium, all EI dismissals violate the "just cause
principle" (Levine 1989). A proportion q of all workers, EI and NE, who are not
d i s m i s s e di nap a r t i c u l a rp e r i o da r ea s s umed to be displaced for other reasons.
To derive the incentive condition for EI workers, observe that the lifetime
utilities of those who expend ¯ e and those who do not, denoted V1 and V2,a r e :
4This is less restrictive than ﬁrst seems. It can be shown that within this class models,
ﬁrms will choose harsh dismissal policies. For an example, see Levine (1989).
4V1 =
ω − ¯ e + θqV3
1 − θ(1 − q)
(1)
V2 =
ω + θ(d + q(1 − d))V3
1 − θ(1 − q)(1 − d)
(2)
where V3 is the lifetime utility of an unemployed EI worker.5 EI workers will
therefore not withhold eﬀort if V1 ≥ V2 or, from (1) and (2), if:
ω ≥
µ
1 − θ(1 − q)(1 − d)
θd(1 − q)
¶
¯ e +( 1− θ)V3 (3)
When this requirement is just met, V3 will itself be a simple function of V1 and




(1 − θ(1 − a))
(4)
Substitution for V1 in (1) then leads to:
V3 =
a(ω − ¯ e)
(1 − θ)(1 − θ(1 − a)(1 − q)(1 − fd))
(5)




1 − θ(1 − a)(1 − q)(1 − d)
θ(1 − a)(1 − q)d
¶
¯ e (6)
This is a variant of the familiar Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) "no shirking condition"
and, as such, shares some of its characteristic properties: to induce their EI
workers to expend eﬀort, for example, ﬁrms must oﬀer them higher wages the
higher the likelihoods of rehire a or separation q, or the lower the likelihood of
detection d.
5To derive (for example) the second condition, observe that the likelihood that an EI worker
who withholds eﬀort will lose her job at the end of the period is equal to d+(1−d)q,t h es u m
of the probabilities that she is detected, d, and not detected but separated for other reasons,
q(1−d). The likelihood that she remains employed is therefore 1−(d+(1−d)q)=( 1 −d)(1−q).
Bellman’s Principle then implies that V1 = ω + θ[(d + q(1 − d))V3 +( 1− q)(1 − d)V1] which
is, after simplication, the expression in (2). The derivation of (1) follows similar lines.
6To conﬁrm (4), observe that an EI job seeker will be oﬀered a job, and therefore receive
V1, with likelihood a, but receive θV3 with likelihood 1 − a under the assumption that wages
and eﬀort are both zero in the current period in the event of an unsuccessful search.
5There is a critical diﬀerence between the two incentive conditions, however,
because the presence of NE workers aﬀects the likelihood that EI workers are
rehired. If there are N employed workers, both EI and NE, each period, and a
fraction π of these are NE, the number of workers who will lose their jobs each
period is [q(1−π)+(d+q(1−d))π]N and, in stationary equilibrium, the same
number will be (re)hired at the start of the next.7 It follows that (1−d)(1−q)πN
NE and (1−q)(1−π)N EI workers will retain their jobs from one period to the
next, and that H −[(1−q)(1−π)+(1−q)(1−d)π]N = H −(1−q)(1−πd)N
workers, EI and NE, will be available for hire at the start of each period. The
common likelihood of rehire a is therefore:
a =
[q(1 − π)+( d + q(1 − d))π]N
H − [(1 − q)(1 − π)+( 1− q)(1 − d)π]N
=
(πd+ q(1 − πd))n
1 − (1 − q)(1 − πd)n
(7)
or the ratio of new hires to (start of period) job seekers, where n = N/H is the
employment rate.
This implies that for ﬁxed N, the introduction of NE workers is associated
with an increase in the likelihood of rehire: (1 − q)πd more workers are hired
each period,8 and the number of those without work the same amount, from
H −(1−q)N to H −[(1−q)(1−π)+ ( 1−q)(1−d)π]N. In the absence of any
employment eﬀects, then, EI (and for that matter, NE) workers will command
higher wages. In graphical terms, the incentive condition or "supply wage
relation" (Blanchard and Katz, 1997) shifts upward in (ω,n)-space.
The intuition for this result is that the introduction of NE workers causes
labor markets to become more turbulent: conditional on the size of its work
force, each ﬁrm will hire and ﬁre more workers each period. For the risk neutral
EI worker, such turbulence is beneﬁcial: the likelihood of rehire rises (or, from
another perspective, the expected duration of joblessness falls) after a random
separation.
7The likelihood that an employed EI worker will lose her position at the end of a particular
period is q, while the likelihood that an NE worker will is d+(1−d)q. It follows that q(1−π)N
EI workers and (d +( 1− d)q)πN NE workers will be subtracted and (in equilibrium) added
to the number of employed workers each period.
8This is the diﬀerence between the number hired when π =0 , qN, and the number hired
when π 6=0 , [q(1 − π)+( d + q(1 − d))π]N.
6On the other hand, the proportion of those without jobs at the end of each
period who are NE, denoted p, will exceed the proportion, denoted π,o ft h o s e
with jobs who are also NE. The relative NE-abundance of the jobless pool is in
turn the source of the reputation eﬀect that undermines the post-displacement
position of EI workers. To formalize this, observe that as a consequence of
Bayes’ Theorem, the likelihood that a particular worker is NE, conditional on
membership in the start-of-period jobless pool, is equal to the ratio of the like-
lihood that she is NE and jobless to the likelihood that she is jobless:9
p =
 H − (1 − q)(1 − d)πN
H − [(1 − q)(1 − π)+( 1− q)(1 − d)π]N
=
 H − (1 − q)(1 − d)πN
H − (1 − q)(1 − πd)N
=
  − (1 − q)(1 − d)πn
1 − (1 − q)(1 − πd)n
(8)
For the number of jobless NE workers to remain constant in equilibrium, how-
ever, p must meet a second condition:10
p =
π(d + q(1 − d))
π(d + q(1 − d)) + (1 − π)q
=
π(d + q(1 − d))
πd+ q(1 − πd)
(9)
Combined, (8) and (9) deﬁne a pair of implicit functions p = p(n) and
π = π(n) with three important properties:
(i) the proportion p = p(n) of those out of work at the start of each
period who are NE is an increasing function of n,w i t hp(0) =   and
p(1) =  (d + q(1 − d))/( d + q(1 −  d))
9This expression can also be motivated as a constraint on the total number of NE workers
in equilibrium, and the companion to (9), which constrains the number of NE workers in the
jobless pool.
10To motivate (9), observe that there are πN employed NE workers at the start of each
period, of whom (d + q(1 − d))πN will either be separated or detected and dismissed at the
end of the same period. Since a proportion p of all those in the start of period jobless pool,
and therefore of all new hires, are NE, it follows that [π(d+q(1−d))+(1−π)q]pN NE workers
will be hired each period. If these ﬂows are to oﬀset in equilibrium, then (9) must hold.
7(ii) the proportion π = π(n) of those employed each period who are
NE is also an increasing function of n,w i t hπ(0) =  q/(q +( 1−
q)(1 −  )d) and π(1) =  ,a n d
(iii) for n ∈ (0,1),p (n) > >π (n)
To provide some intuition for these, observe that the third condition, the basis of
the reputation eﬀect, is consistent with the view that for each n, the likelihood
q that employed EI workers will ﬁnd themselves in the jobless pool at the end of
each period is smaller (perhaps much so) than the likelihood that NE workers
will. If the number of EI (or NE) workers who are hired each period is to
equal the number who lose their positions, then the proportion π of employed
NE workers must be less than the proportion p of job seekers who are also NE.
In other words, the likelihood that someone chosen at random from the jobless
pool will be NE exceeds the likelihood that those now at work will be. The
second condition follows from the requirement that as n rises, so, too, must
the proportion π of employed workers who are NE, as more of the otherwise
NE-abundant pool of job seekers is absorbed. As π rises, however, so does the
proportion p of those out of work who are also NE, and this is the rationale for
the ﬁrst condition.
A "demand wage relation" (Blanchard and Katz, 1997) or "price-setting
curve" (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991) is then needed to close the model.
To this end, assume that when eﬀort is positive and eﬀective, each new worker
adds a constant α¯ e units to total output. Because new workers are recruited
from the jobless pool, however, and a proportion p(n) <π (n) of these are NE,
the average product of labor, α¯ e(1−π(n)), declines as employment n rises, and
exceeds the marginal product of labor, α¯ e(1 − p(n)). Firms are assumed to
be imperfect competitors in product markets, and to set prices as a constant
mark-up, µ, over marginal labor costs.11 The demand wage relation is therefore:
ω =
α¯ e(1 − p(n))
1+µ
(10)
A pair of representative equilibria, with and without NE workers, is depicted
in Figure 1. For the reason explained earlier, the presence of NE workers shifts
11The constant mark-up rule is a common simpliﬁcation that commands limited support
from empirical macroeconomists. For a review of the literature, see Woodford and Rotemberg
(1999).
8the incentive condition upward, from IC1 to IC2. The demand wage curve
p i v o t s ,a n ds h i f t s ,d o w n w a r d ,f r o mD1 to D2. As a result, those workers with
jobs will be paid less, ω∗
2 rather than ω∗
1,a n df e w e rw o r k e r s ,n∗
2 versus n∗
1, will
have them. To understand how income is reduced but also redistributed, observe
that ﬁrms’ net (of labor costs) revenues per worker will be:
α¯ e(1 − π(n)) − ω = α¯ e(1 − π(n)) −
α¯ e(1 − p(n))
1+µ
=
µα¯ e(1 − π(n))
1+µ
+
α¯ e(p(n) − π(n))
1+µ
(11)
If there were two sorts of workers but the sale of labor power were not "con-
tested" (Bowles and Gintis 1993), the proportions p and π would be constant and
equal, the real wage would (also) be equal to
α¯ e(1−π)
1+µ and the ﬁrst term in (11)
would be net revenues per worker. Firms do better than this, however, because
of the additional beneﬁt represented in the second term, which is the reputation
cost of job loss: it is the diﬀerence in expected productivities (marked down)
of those with and without jobs, α¯ e(1−π(n))−α¯ e(1−p(n)) = α¯ e(p(n)−π(n)).
[Insert Figure 1 About Here]
Net revenues and therefore proﬁts will rise if, as is the case here, the "per
unit eﬀect" dominates the "quantity eﬀect." If it is workers who own these
ﬁrms, household income will fall but an increased share of this reduced income
will assume the form of dividends, etc.
3 Comparative Statics For A Calibrated Bench-
mark Model
The comparative statics of the benchmark model are not diﬃcult to characterize
in qualitative terms, but an evaluation of their practical importance requires
the substitution of plausible parameter values, some of which are diﬃcult to
calibrate. To start, the rates of separation q and time preference θ were set
equal to 0.15 and 0.95, respectively. The former is consistent with the adjusted
ﬂow data in Summers and Poterba (1986)12 and the latter is the equivalent of a
12It is also less than the estimates in Abowd and Zellner (1985) but more than the "between
DWS sample" displacement rates reported in Farber (2003).
95.2% real interest rate in the absence of ﬁnancial market imperfections. In the
limit case of no NE workers, the position of the horizontal demand wage schedule
determines the equilibrium wage, in which case αe
1+µ =4 0(thousand per annum)
is a reasonable choice. If labor’s share is two thirds, which implies that µ =0 .50,
then αe =6 0 . We know much less about the individual parameters α and e than
their product, however, and still less about the likelihood of detection d, but the
values of e and d determine the position of the incentive condition and therefore,
even in the limit case, the equilibrium level of employment. Some trial and error
led to e =5- and therefore α =1 2-a n dd =0 .50 as sensible ﬁrst choices: the
equilibrium unemployment u∗ and rehire a∗ rates are then equal to 5.4% and
72.5%, respectively, where the latter corresponds to a mean (completed) jobless
spell of 19.7 weeks.13 To compare these numbers to US data for the fourth
quarter of 2004, the average unemployment rate was 5.5 percent, the average
duration of unemployment was almost 20 weeks, and average earnings in goods-
producing sectors were a little less than $700 per week or $36000 per year.
The comparative statics for the parameter of interest,  , are summarized in
Table 1, which reports the equilibrium values of ω∗, u∗ and a∗,a sw e l la st h e
equilibrium proportions p∗ and π∗, as the share of NE workers varies between 0
and 10 percent. It also reports the mean jobless spell, in weeks, consistent with
a∗, the reputation cost of job loss
α¯ e(p(n)−π(n))
1+µ ,d e ﬁned above, the reduction
in output and increase in net revenues, both expressed as a proportion of their
respective values in the baseline (  =0 )c a s e ,a sw e l la st h ej o b l e s sr a t e sf o rt h e
EI and NE sub-populations, denoted u∗
EI and u∗
NE.14
[Insert Table 1 About Here]
The numbers in Table 1 suggest that labor market outcomes are quite sen-
sitive to variations in  . As the share of NE workers in the labor force rises
from 0 to just 2 percent, for example, the wages of employed workers fall from
40 thousand to 37.5 thousand, or by 6.25 percent. Total output falls much less
than this, however, about 1.7 percent, while ﬁrms’ net revenues rise almost 7
percent, which implies that the redistribution eﬀect dominates in practice. The
13If these numbers are indeed reasonable, the calibrated model lends some support to
Juster’s (1985) view that the costs of job-related activities are often small.
14The values of u∗
EI and u∗





10unemployment rate rises 0.7 percentage points, from 5.4 to 6.1 percent, but this
obscures an important diﬀerence: the rate for EI workers is 5.8 percent, but
that of NE workers is 19.1. Likewise, the likelihood of rehire falls, from 72.5
percent to 70.8, equivalent to an increase in the mean jobless spell from 19.7
weeks to 21.4.
The equilibrium values of p∗ and π∗, which are central to the characterization
of labor market behavior in this framework, are 6.3 and 1.7 percent, respectively.
In other words, when 2 percent of all workers cannot expend eﬀective eﬀort, ﬁrms
will infer that more than 6 percent of all those available for hire at the start of
each period have this characteristic. It follows that the expected productivities
of workers with and without jobs will be αe(1−π(n)) = 59.0 and αe(1−p(n)) =
56.2 thousand, so that the reputation cost of job loss,
αe(p(n)−π(n))
1+µ ,i sm o r e
than $1800, or four and a half percent of the representative EI worker’s wages.
This is smaller than the estimates listed in the introduction, but the assumed
proportion of NE workers is also small, and unlike the extended model in the
fourth section, this calculation does not include the possible depreciation of
human capital after displacement.
As the proportion of NE workers is increased to 10 percent, the redistri-
bution eﬀect becomes even more pronounced: output falls (just) 8.3 percent
relative to the "no NE" baseline, but wages fall more than 25 percent, from
40 thousand to 29.6 thousand. The net revenues of ﬁrms, on the other hand,
increase 21.7 percent relative to the same baseline. The overall, EI and NE
unemployment rates are now 9.4, 7.7 and 24.3 percent, respectively, while the
common likelihood of rehire falls to 64.2 percent, consistent with an increase in
the mean jobless spell to 28.9 weeks or between 6 and 7 months. The equilib-
rium values of π∗ and p∗ increase to 8.4 and 25.9 percent, so that the reputation
cost of job loss is about $7000 or almost 25 percent of the now reduced wage
rate, a number much closer to current estimates.
As alluded to earlier, however, there are few empirical studies to motivate
the choice of the detection rate d and the cost of eﬀort ¯ e (or, if one prefers,
output per unit of eﬀort α) so that some sort of robustness check is needed.
To this end, Figures 2(a)-2(c) plot the equilibrium wage ω∗,j o b l e s sr a t eu∗ and
reputation eﬀect R∗ for values of d between 0.25 and 0.75 and ¯ e between 2.5
11and 7.5, with the product α¯ e ﬁxed at 60 for   =0 .02 or 2 percent.15
[Insert Figures 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) About Here]
Figure 2(a) reveals that once α¯ e is ﬁx e d ,t h e" p r i c ee ﬀects" of variations in
either the likelihood of detection or cost of eﬀort will be small in practice. As
expected, for example, the real wage ω is an increasing function of ¯ e, but for
the initial choice of d (=0 .50), it rises from 37.3 thousand when ¯ e =2 .5 to just
37.7 thousand when ¯ e =7 .5.T h e e ﬀects of variations in d are not much more
dramatic: for ¯ e =5 , the wage falls from 38.4 thousand when the detection rate
is 25 percent to 36.6 thousand when it is 75 percent.
As Figure 2(b) shows, however, the "quantity eﬀects" are substantial. At
the benchmark detection rate, for example, an increase in the cost of eﬀort from
2.5 thousand to 7.5 causes the jobless rate to rise from 2.8 percent to 9.9.I n
a similar vein, as the likelihood of detection rises from 25 to 75 percent, it falls
from 11.1 to 4.3 percent.
4 Positive Feedback and Multiple Equilibria in
an Extended Model
There are at least two sorts of explanation for the existence of NE workers.
The ﬁrst follows from the observation that unemployed EI workers will some-
times become NE. The simplest reason for this is that separation causes ﬁrm-
or sector-speciﬁc human capital to be lost, a phenomenon explored in the em-
pirical work of Hamermesh (1987) and Topel (1990). For displaced workers
who are not rehired soon, the slow(er) erosion of more portable skills would
produce similar results. The adverse psychological eﬀects of joblessness could
also explain such transformations: Darity and Goldsmith (1996), for example,
ﬁnd that unemployment produces measurable damage to workers’ well-being
and that mental health is an important determinant of productivity. In a
similar vein, Oswald (1997) concludes that joblessness is a source of substantial
"non-pecuniary distress." If, in the present context, all of these are understood
in terms of an increased likelihood of "failure," where failure means that eﬀort
15The intervals are equal to the initial values plus or minus 50 percent.
12is ineﬀective, some workers will ﬁnd it rational, in the sense of (3), to withhold
eﬀort altogether.
A second, and quite diﬀerent, explanation turns on the identiﬁcation of NE
workers as those with substantial extra-market opportunities and/or wealth:
the better a worker’s default position, the smaller the punishment value of dis-
missal and therefore the better the incentives that ﬁrms must provide to induce
the required eﬀort level.
To sketch an extension of the model based on the ﬁrst of these, suppose that
EI workers are as before but that NE workers now have preferences u(ω,e)=
ω − ke,w h e r ek>1 is chosen so that, for all "reasonable" values of ω, e =0is
optimal: NE workers, in other words, ﬁnd it more diﬃcult, if not impossible, to
provide the required level of eﬀective eﬀort ¯ e. Suppose, too, that there is some
likelihood z2 that an unemployed EI worker will become NE after each period
spent in the jobless pool, but some likelihood z1 that an employed NE worker
will become EI, despite the absence of eﬀective eﬀort.16 (Strictly speaking, the
second is less "learning by doing" than "learning by observing.") In heuristic
terms, z1 and z2 are the rates at which workers reskill and deskill.
[Insert Figure 3 About Here]
Even with attention restricted to stationary pooling equilibria, the charac-
terization of labor market ﬂows - in particular, the determination of z1, z2 and
the now endogenous   - becomes more complicated. From the schematic in
Figure 3, for example, the number of EI workers with jobs will increase for two
reasons: a(1 − p)S EI workers will be hired from the jobless pool, where S
is the number of those out of work at the start of each period, before ﬁrms
have replaced their "lost" workers, and a fraction z1 of the (1 − q)(1 − d)πN
NE workers with jobs who were neither separated nor dismissed in the previous
period will have reskilled and become EI. It will decrease, on the other hand,
because a fraction of q of the (1 − π)N E Iw o r k e r se m p l o y e de a c hp e r i o dw i l l
be displaced. For the number of EI workers with jobs to remain constant in
equilibrium, then, it must be that:
16It is also assumed that the number of workers is suﬃcient to treat expected and actual
ﬂows as equal.
13a(1 − p)S + z1(1 − q)(1 − d)πN = q(1 − π)N (12)
where:
S = H − [(1 − π)(1 − q)+( 1− d)(1 − q)π]N = H − (1 − q)(1 − πd)N (13)
is one measure of the number of job seekers.
Likewise, for the number of NE workers with jobs, and the number of EI
workers without, to remain constant from one period to the next, it must be
that:17
apS =[ z1(1 − q)(1 − d)+( q + d(1 − q)]πN (14)
and:18
a(1 − p)S = q(1 − π)N − z2(1 − a)(1 − p)S (15)
It is then convenient to replace either (12) or (14) with a linear combination of
the two:
a =
[(q + d(1 − q))π + q(1 − π)]N
S
(16)
which then deﬁnes the likelihood of rehire in the extended model.
Substitution for the likelihood of rehire in (12) then implies that:
p =
z1(1 − q)(1 − d)π +( q + d(1 − q))π
(q + d(1 − q)) + q(1 − π)
(17)
which establishes an important relationship between p, π and z1 that, perhaps
surprisingly, does not depend on the total number of workers N employed each
period. Substitution for both a and S in (15), on the other hand, leads to:
17If (12), (14) and (15) are satisﬁed, then, as a matter of addition, the number of unemployed
NE workers will also remain constant.
18The ﬁrst of these requires that the number apS of NE workers hired each period must
oﬀset the number of NE workers who are either displaced or dismissed and the number of NE
workers who are neither but become EI at the end of the period. The second asserts that the
number of EI workers who are hired, and therefore leave the jobless pool, each period must
equal the sum of the number of EI workers who are displaced and the number of EI workers
who are deskilled.
14z2 =
pq(1 − π)N − (1 − p)(q + d(1 − q))πN
(1 − p)(H − N)
(18)
Given the likelihoods z1 and z2 that workers are reskilled and deskilled and the
number of workers with jobs N, (17) and (18) determine the proportions π and
p of NE workers with and without jobs consistent with ﬂow equilibrium, and
(16) then determines the likelihood of rehire a. There is no stock condition for
the proportion   of NE workers in the labor force as a whole because its value
is now determined within the model:
  =
pS − (1 − q)(1 − d)(1 − z1)πN
H
(19)
(As a matter of deﬁnition, a proportion p of the number of job seekers S at the
start of each period are NE, while the number of those who retain their jobs
from one period to the next is [1−z1(1−q)(1−d)−(q +d(1−q))]πN or, after
simpliﬁcation, (1−q)(1−d)(1−z1)πN. The sum of these is therefore equal to
the total number of NE workers,  H.)
I ti ss t i l lt h ec a s et h a tp> >πfor each N, but the values of p and π
consistent with (17) and (18) are now decreasing in N.19 In other words, as the
number of those with jobs N rises, the proportion π of these who are NE, as
well as the proportion p of job seekers who are, will rise, too. This implies
that the demand wage relation will slope upward. Labor markets now exhibit
positive feedback: as the volume of employment N rises, the share of the labor
force that is NE falls as some who would have otherwise remained (re)acquire
productive skills. This in turn pulls down the proportions π and p of those
with and without jobs who are NE which, under these conditions, is suﬃcient
to "deconvexify" production.20
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b About Here]
Viewed from a somewhat diﬀerent perspective, each new hire now produces
positive externalities. A proportion p of these hires will be NE and, of these, a
19To see this, observe that (17) implies that p and π must rise and fall together, and that
( 1 8 )i m p l i e st h a ta sb o t hr i s e ,N must fall, and vice versa.
20Under normal conditions, the existence of a countercyclical mark-up and/or procyclical
"real marginal cost" causes the wage demand relation to slope downward. If either or both
were present here, intuition suggests that the relation would be hump-shaped: for small values
of N, the "reskill eﬀect" would dominate, but that as N approaches H,t h em a r k - u pa n d / o r
returns eﬀects would. If so, the essential properties of the model would be unaﬀected.
15proportion 1−z1 will remain so from this period to the next, and even if some,
perhaps most, of these are dismissed or displaced in the current period, some
will continue in their jobs. The remainder, or a proportion z1 of new NE hires,
will be reskilled, but of these, q percent will nevertheless return to the jobless
pool at the end of the period, where other ﬁrms will hire some of them, and
therefore reap the beneﬁts, but not bear the costs, of their investment in skills.
(Because ﬁrms also retain a fraction 1−q of these reskilled workers, most of the
beneﬁts are captured, however.)
To derive the incentive condition for EI workers, observe ﬁrst that the life-
time utilities V EI
1 and V EI
2 of workers who are eﬀort inducible at the start of a
particular period are the same, mutatis mutandis, as in the benchmark model,
so that (3) still constrains ﬁrms’ oﬀers to such workers. The calculation of V EI
3 ,
however, the welfare of a (for the moment, at least) EI worker in the jobless
pool is more involved. The EI worker who is displaced at the end of a par-
ticular period will now receive a job oﬀer, and therefore V EI
1 , with likelihood
a; will not receive an oﬀer but remain EI, and so expect θV EI
3 ,with likelihood
(1−a)(1−z2); and, most important, will neither receive an oﬀer nor remain EI
- that is, be deskilled - with likelihood (1 − a)z2, the value of which is θV NE
3 ,
where V NE
3 is the lifetime utility of an NE worker who is (currently) without a




1 +( 1− a)z2θV NE
3
1 − θ(1 − a)(1 − z2)
(20)
To calculate V NE
3 , observe that NE workers without jobs will ﬁnd a position,
and receive θV NE
2 - not, it is important to note, θV NE
1 ,s i n c ei tw a sassumed
that NE workers choose not to expend eﬀort, which implies that V NE
2 >VNE
1
- with likelihood a, but not ﬁnd a job, and thus receive θV NE
3 , with likelihood





1 − θ(1 − a)
(21)
The value of V NE
2 is in turn a function of V EI
1 , V EI




ω + θz1[(d + q(1 − d))V EI
3 +( 1− d)(1 − q)V EI
1 ]
+θ(1 − z1)(d + q(1 − d))V NE
3
1 − θ(1 − q)(1 − d)(1 − z1)
(22)
16the derivation of which involves no new complications. The NE worker with
aj o br e c e i v e sω (not ω − ¯ e) in the current period, but with some likelihood
z1(d+q(1−d)), for example, she will reskill but be detected (and then dismissed)
or displaced for other reasons and so receive V EI
3 at the start of the next period,
and so on.
Combined, (1), (20), (21) and (22) comprise four linear equations in four
unknowns - V EI
1 , V EI
3 ,VNE
2 and V NE
3 - and the substitution of the solution for
V EI
3 into the incentive condition for EI workers provides the required modiﬁca-
tion of (5).
Figure 4a, introduced earlier, depicts the representative incentive and de-
mand wage schedules in the three equilibrium case. For z1 =0 .90 and z2 =0 .10,
for example, there is a stable interior equilibrium at which n =9 3 .7 percent (or
u =6 .3 percent), an unstable equilibrium at which n =2 2percent (or u =7 8
percent) and a stable corner equilibrium (n =0percent or u = 100 percent).
The last of these equilibria is not implausible, however, if the model is recast
as one with dual labor markets à la Bulow and Summers (1986). In their model,
most of those who do not ﬁnd work in the primary market, in which eﬀort is
diﬃcult to monitor, are absorbed into the secondary market, in which it is not.
Viewed from this perspective, the corner equilibrium should be interpreted as
one in which everyone works in the secondary market, rather than one in which,
implausibly, no one is employed. If so, the relative sizes of these two markets
is less determinate than often supposed. In particular, a predetermined set of
preferences, endowments and methods of production can be consistent, both in
principle and in practice, with either a vibrant or dormant high wage sector.
This pattern is reminiscent of the earliest neoclassical (Solow 1956) mod-
els of underdevelopment traps, in which the feedback mechanism assumes the
form of an intensive production function that is concave for capital-labor ratios
below some threshold and convex above it. In the tradition of Azariadis and
Drazen (1990) and others, the model described here identiﬁes the labor market
as one source of such non-convexities. In particular, if the volume of primary
sector employment is smaller than the thr e s h o l da s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h eu n s t a b l e
equilibrium - in the case where z1 =0 .90 and z2 =0 .10, 22 percent of the labor
force - the number of workers who could and would exert eﬀort level ¯ e will be
too small for the expected contribution of the last (or next) hire to exceed the
17incentive wage for such workers. If, as a result, employment falls, however,
still more workers are deskilled, and the expected marginal product of new hires
falls even further and, more important, faster than the incentive that EI workers
require. In this environment, a state-sponsored "big push" (Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny, 1989) might be needed to ensure that employment in this sector
reaches criticial mass or, to invoke Rostow’s (1960) famous metaphor, "takes
oﬀ."
It is important to remember, however, that the existence of three equilibria -
and, in particular, the existence of a stable equilibrium in which some, perhaps
most, of the labor force is employed in the primary sector - is not assured.
If, for example, the reskill rate remains equal to 90 percent but the likelihood
that workers are deskilled rises to, say, 50 percent, the relative positions of the
incentive and labor demand schedules are those in Figure 4(b), in which case
there is just one stable corner equilibrium, at which u = 100 percent. Under
these conditions, no primary labor market is (ever) viable. The reason for
this is the increased, and now substantial, likelihood that EI workers who ﬁnd
themselves in the jobless pool are deskilled and therefore transformed into NE
workers: when the number of primary sector workers is small, there are more
NE workers in the jobless pool, and the expected contribution of new hires is
low, but as primary sector employment increases, the decrease in the proportion
o fN Ew o r k e r si sm o r et h a no ﬀset by the increase in the eﬀort compatible wage.
Figure 4(b) is reminiscent of Mankiw’s (1986) representation of ﬁnancial
market collapse. This is not a coincidence, of course: in the presence of adverse
s e l e c t i o ni nc r e d i tm a r k e t s ,a ni n c r e a s ei ni n t e r e s tr a t e si ss o m e t i m e sa s s o c i a t e d ,
for the reasons ﬁrst described in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), with an increase in
the riskiness of loans and under some conditions, there will be no interest rate
at which the expected return is suﬃcient for banks to lend. The breakdown of
the labor, rather than credit, market depicted in Figure 4(b) embodies a similar
logic: there is sometimes no employment level at which the expected return on
a new hire exceeds the wage required to induce eﬀective eﬀort.
To return to the "normal" case, it is useful to characterize the (local) com-
parative statics of the stable interior equilibrium with respect to the reskill and
deskill rates. Consider, for example, the eﬀects of an increase in the likelihood
that EI workers in secondary sector jobs are deskilled z2. On one hand, the
18modiﬁed demand wage relation shifts downward since, for each N, the propor-
tion p of all workers without such jobs who are NE will increase. Consistent
with Figure 3(a), this exerts downward pressure on both wages and employment.
On the other hand, the modiﬁed incentive condition also shifts downward, since
the EI worker who withholds eﬀort now risks detection, dismissal and an in-
creased likelihood that she will be deskilled, which increases the cost of job loss
for ﬁxed N. This in turn would tend to increase employment and, because of
the positive feedback mechanism built into the primary sector, the equilibrium
wage rate. The net eﬀects on ω and N depend, in other words, on the relative
sizes of these shifts, which are diﬃcult to predict ap r i o r i .
To determine which shift dominates in practice, Figures 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c)
plot the equilibrium wage, unemployment rate and reputation cost of job loss
for reskill rates z1 between 0.5 and 1 and deskill rates z2 between 0 and 0.25.
To anchor the discussion that follows, the pair ( z1 =0 .9,z 2 =0 .1) will serve
as a benchmark of sorts: in this case, ω =3 6 .1 thousand, u =6 .3 percent and
R =3 .3 thousand.
[Insert Figures 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) and 5(d) About Here]
Two features stand out. First, it is clear that the ﬁrst (demand wage) shift
dominates: as the deskill rate rises, ceteris paribus, the wage rate falls and
unemployment rises. In more evocative terms, the more rapid depreciation
of human capital has a more substantial eﬀect on productivity, loosely deﬁned,
than bargaining power. Second, the equilibrium values appear to be sensitive to
variations in the deskill rate. As z2 increases from 10 to 25 percent, for example,
the wage falls 20 percent, to 29.7 thousand, while the unemployment rate rises
from 6.3 to 8.6 percent. Likewise, the reputation cost of job loss increases
from a little more than 9 percent of annual wages to almost 30 percent, or 8.5
thousand.
The net eﬀect of variations in the reskill rate is also the result of competing
shifts of the demand wage and incentive conditions. An increase in z1 will
reduce the proportion p of job seekers who are NE at each N and so causes the
demand wage relation to shift upward, which tends, ceteris paribus,t oi n c r e a s e
both ω and N. It will also cause the incentive condition to shift upward,
however, because there is an increased likelihood that workers who are displaced
19and deskilled will (re)acquire these skills, which then reduces the punishment
value of dismissal. Unlike the case of the deskill rate, however, the two shifts
more or less oﬀset one another. As the reskill rate is reduced from 90 to 50
percent, for example, the equilibrium wage falls from 36.1 thousand to just
34.1, the unemployment rate rises from 6.3 percent to 7.0, and percent, and the
reputation cost of job loss rises from 3.3 thousand (or 9 percent of compensation)
to 4.6 thousand (or 13 percent).
To provide still another perspective on these results, Figure 5(d) plots the
now endogenous proportion   of the labor force that is NE. For the benchmark
values z1 =0 .90 and z2 =0 .10, for example, 9.8 percent of all workers are
NE. As the reskill rate decreases to 50 percent (but the deskill rate remains
the same) the proportion rises to 15.2 percent. When the reskill rate is held
ﬁxed, however, and the likelihood that workers are deskilled rises to 25 percent,
26 percent of the labor force will be NE.
Accepted at face value, these data contain at least two lessons for macro-
economists. First, that the destruction and formation of human capital are
important medium run processes, that is, even when the net rate of human
capital accumulation is zero. Second, that within this context, the loss of
productive skills should receive at least as much attention as their acquisition:
on the basis of these results, labor market outcomes are more sensitive to the
former than the latter.
Last, it is also possible to calculate, for the same values of z1 and z2,t h e
volume (expressed as a fraction of the labor force) of primary sector employment
associated with the unstable equilibrium. (Given the correspondence principle,
the data are better interpreted in terms of the minimum viable mass of the
primary sector in diﬀerent economies, and not as variations in this mass.)
[Insert Figure 6 About Here]
Consistent with intuition, Figure 6 reveals that economies in which the like-
lihood that displaced workers are deskilled is lower have a smaller viable mass.
(There is also more primary sector employment in the stable equilibrium, con-
sistent with Figure 5(b).) If the deskill rate increases much more than this,
of course, both interior equilibria are lost. Figure 6 also conﬁrms that similar
beneﬁts - better stable equilibrium, smaller minimum viable mass - also accrue
to economies in which more recent hires are reskilled.
20For the benchmark values z1 =0 .90 and z2 =0 .10, this threshold is equal
to 21.7 of the labor force, and for a smaller reskill rate (z1 =0 .50), it increases
to 28.2 percent. When the reskill rate is held ﬁxed at 90 percent, however, and
the deskill rate is increased to 25, then the minimum viable mass is almost half
(47.9 percent) of the labor force.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The proposition that the presence of non-eﬀort inducible workers will somehow
beneﬁt ﬁrms seems counterintuitive until is recalled that in practice, the punish-
ment value of dismissal often comprises a reputation cost. If a small number of
such workers are introduced into the standard labor discipline model, and these
workers cannot be distinguished from their eﬀort inducible peers, a reputation
eﬀect, in the form of a diﬀerence in the mean productivities of workers with and
without jobs, is established, a variation on Greenwald (1987). As a result, the
number of employed workers and total output both fall, but non-labor income
rises, both absolutely and as a share of national income. If the depreciation and
acquisition of productive skills are made endogenous, labor markets will exhibit
positive feedback and multiple equilibria for plausible parameter values. Under
these conditions, the stable high employment equilibrium appears to be sensi-
tive to variations in the rate at which jobless workers lose their skills, a result
that underscores the importance of recent empirical work on displacement.
A natural extension of the model would reinterpret its labor market(s) in re-
gional, or perhaps urban, terms. In economies where the costs of (sub-national)
migration are not trivial, this framework allows, at least in principle, for the co-
existence of vibrant and stagnant primary labor markets. In some cities, the
model hints, the secondary, or even shadow, labor market will dominate pre-
cisely because it dominated in the past: the previous depreciation of human
capital is an obstacle to ﬁrm relocation, despite the low(er) costs of labor. If
as u ﬃcient number of ﬁrms could be persuaded to relocate, however, the accu-
mulation of productive skills would make relocation proﬁtable. To escape these
localized underdevelopment traps, a "big push" may be needed to establish a
viable primary sector. What form this push should take - whether investment
in "job market skills" or tax incentives to lure, and then retain, new ﬁrms - is
not clear, however.
21The implications for some less developed economies are similar. In cases
where no vibrant primary sector exists, the explanation may be that no such
sector has ever existed - so that the productive skills that would rationalize
substantial domestic or foreign investment have not been accumulated - not
that it could not exist.
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  ε  =  0%  ε  =  2%  ε  =  4%  ε  =  6%  ε  =  8%  ε  =  10% 
ω  40.0 37.5 35.2 33.2 31.3  29.6 
u  5.4 6.1 6.8 7.6 8.5  9.4 
a  72.5 70.8 69.2 67.6 65.9  64.2 
Weeks  19.7 21.4 23.1 24.9 26.9  28.9 
p    6.3  11.9 17.1 21.7  25.9 
π    1.7 3.4 5.1 6.7  8.4 
Rep    1.8 3.4 4.8 6.0  7.0 
Lost Q    1.7 3.5 5.2 6.7  8.3 
Profits    6.9  12.2 16.4 19.7  21.7 
uEI   4.5 4.9 5.2 5.5  5.8 




Table 1.  The Comparative Statics of Non-Effort Inducible (NE) Workers  
in the Benchmark Model 
 
Notes:  The definitions of ω, u, a, p, π, uEI and uNE are provided in the text and, with the 
exception of the annual real wage ω, which is measured in thousands of dollars, are reported 
in percentage terms.  Weeks is the implied mean length of jobless spells, Rep is the reputation 
cost of displacement, expressed in thousands of dollars, Lost Q is the percentage decrease in 
total output relative to the baseline (ε = 0%) case, and Profits is the percentage increase in total 







Figure 1.  Labor Market Equilibria with and without Non-Effort 

























Figure 2a.  Real Wages (In Thousands Per Year) in the Benchmark Model 








Figure 2b.  Unemployment Rate in the Benchmark Model 









Figure 2c.  Reputation Cost of Job Loss (In Thousands) in the Benchmark Model 
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Figure 5a.  Real Wages (In Thousands Per Year) in Extended Model 






Figure 5b.  Unemployment Rate in Extended Model 










Figure 5c.  Reputation Cost of Job Loss (Thousands) in Extended Model 










Figure 5d.  Share of Non-Effort Inducible (NE) Workers (Percentage of the Labor Force) 







Figure 6.  Minimum Viable Mass (Primary Sector Employment As A Percentage of the 
Labor Force) in Extended Model As a Function of Deskill and Reskill Rates 
 
 